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Abstract. Auditors’ liability is a hot topic nowadays. Due to the increased risks of auditors 
and the lack of appropriate insurance, a limitation of auditors’ liability seems appropriate. Based on 
the economic study of the London Economics, the European Commission issued a consultation 
paper to discuss a European harmonization of auditors’ liability. But to harmonize a liability cap on 
auditors, one needs to examine not only the economic implications, but also the legal restraints and 
differences of auditors’ liability regimes within the European Union. This paper shows that there are 
large discrepancies concerning auditor’s liability towards third parties within the legal systems of 
the European Union. In Belgium, an auditor is liable towards each interested party. However, the 
public role of an auditor is not acknowledged in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. 
In those countries the purpose of audited statements is to fulfil the auditor’s duty to the shareholders 
collectively and not to the stockholders as individual parties or third parties. In Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, an auditor has to encompass a special duty of care towards 
the third party to be liable.  Only a special relationship of the auditor towards a third party could 
imply auditor’s liability toward those parties. This element wasn’t discussed in the London 
Economics Study. However, these findings could have a major impact on the debate to harmonize 
an auditor’s liability cap because the more parties can pursue an auditor, the more damage can be 
claimed and the higher the liability cap needs to be fixed. 
1. Introduction 
 
Due to the increased market capitalization of companies during the last decade, the risk of auditing such 
companies has increased similarly. At the same time, access to insurance for auditors has fallen sharply, especially 
for firms auditing international and listed companies, thus leaving partners in audit firms with an unattractive 
prospect of entirely supporting the liability risks themselves. Numerous financial scandals such as Enron, 
Worldcom, and Parmalat (etc.) underlined these issues.  
This paper will show that there are large discrepancies concerning auditor’s liability towards third parties 
within the legal systems of the European Union. To be able to litigate an auditor some legal systems require 
specific conditions of a third party. Four legal systems are to be compared: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Belgium. These findings will have serious consequences on the debate about the limitation of 
auditors’ liability because the number of claimants and therefore the amount of damage could vary enormously. 
 
2.    A European initiative to harmonize auditors’ liability cap 
 
In pursuance of article 31 of the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC (OJ L 157, 9.6.2006, 87-107), the European 
Commission ordered a report concerning this debate, more specific on the economic impact of current national 
liability rules carrying out statutory audits on European capital markets and on the insurance conditions for 
statutory auditors and audit firms, including an objective analysis on the limitations on financial liability. The 
extensive report of the London Economics on the economic impact of auditors’ liability regimes of September 
2006 indicated that the current amount of high value actual of potential claims arising from statutory audits may 
entail serious financial consequences for audits firms. Since the current level of commercial insurance is such that 
it would cover less than 5% of the larger claims some firms face nowadays in some EU Member States, the 
independence audit work could endangered. Within this debate, we may not forget the Enron-fraud already 
evolved in the elimination of one of the Big Audit Firms. Different solutions to resolve this extensive liability risk 
of auditors are to be debated.  
                                                          
1 This paper was first published in Kierkegaard, S.(2007) International Law and Trade: Bridging the East-West 
Divide. IAITL. pp.238-246. 
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In January 2007 the Directorate General for Internal Market and Services issued a consultation document 
on this matter, to be precise on the auditors’ liability and its impact on the European capital markets. It proposes a 
liability cap for European statutory audit. Four options are to be considered:  
 
1. One single monetary cap for all EU member states  
2. A cap depending on the company’s size  
3. A cap depending on audit fees charged to the company and proportionate liability. 
4. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece and Slovenia already capped the liability of the auditors. 
 
To harmonize the auditors’ liability and the limitation of auditors’ liability in particular, it is necessary to 
study the different legal systems within the European Union. In this paper, we highlight the major differences in 
some European legal systems on auditors’ liability towards third parties. A Belgian auditor is liable towards each 
interested third party. In Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, an auditor has to encompass a 
special duty of care towards the third party to be liable.  This means an evaluation will be made of the two 
European common law systems versus two European civil law systems, and with some reflections on the 
American system since the  latter was an inspiration to some legal European systems. This element was not 
discussed in the London Economics Study (2006), but is a significant issue in the liability limitation debate since 
the number of claimants and damage could differ enormously.  
 
3. The United Kingdom 
 
3.1. Liability of an issuer of a statement: Hedley Byrne & Co v. Heller & Partners-case 
 
In the United Kingdom, the third party liability of an auditor is restricted. Numerous cases describe the necessary 
conditions in order for a third party to be able to rely on the auditors’ statements.  
The leading case concerning the liability of an issuer of a statement towards third parties, is the Hedley 
Byrne & Co v. Heller & Partners-case ([1963] 2 All ER 575). These third party liability principles were an 
inspiration for many auditor liability cases.  In the Hedley Byrne & Co v. Heller & Partners-case, the House of 
Lords ruled that a third party who had relied to his detriment on a negligent statement could sue the issuer of the 
statement, despite the absence of privity of the contract. For the first time, the House of Lords recognised the 
possibility of liability for pure economic loss caused by a negligent statement was not dependent on any 
contractual relationship.  
 
Persons uttering statements owe a duty of care to any third person with whom a ‘special 
relationship’ exists. A special relationship requires more than a fiduciary contractual relationship. It 
can arise because of a voluntary assumption of responsibility by the defendant. “All those 
relationships where it is plain that the party seeking information or advice was trusting the other to 
exercise such a degree of care as the circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do 
that, and where the other gave the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that 
the inquirer was relying on him.”. 
 
3.2. Auditor’s Liability: Caparo Industries v. Dickman and others-case 
 
The duty of care of an auditor to third parties was elucidated in the Caparo Industries v. Dickman and others-case 
([1990] 1 All ER 568; AC 605). The Court specified the necessary relationship, as mentioned in the Hedley Byrne 
case, between the maker of a statement or giver of advice (adviser) and the recipient who acts in reliance on it 
(advisee) may typically be held to exist where: 
 
1. “the advise is required for a purpose, whether particularly specified or generally described, which 
is made known either actually or inferentially, to the adviser at the time when the advise is given,  
2. the adviser knows either actually or inferentially, that his advise will be communicated to the 
advisee, either specially or as a member of an ascertainable class, in order that it should be used by 
the advisee for that purpose,  
3. it is known, either actually or inferentially, that the advice so communicated is likely to be acted 
on by the advisee for that purpose without independent inquiry and  
4. it is so acted on by the advisee to his detriment.  
5. That is not of course, to suggest that these conditions are either conclusive, but merely that the 
actual decision in the case does not warrant any broader propositions.” 
 
Based on this judgment a three pronged test for a duty of care is applied: 
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1. foreseeability of damage; 
2. a relationship characterised by the law as one of proximity or neighbourhood (proximity) and 
3. that the situation should be one in which the court considers it would be fair, just and reasonable 
that the law should impose a duty of care given scope on one party for the benefit of the other. 
 
Proximity was the focus of the Caparo Court’s legal analysis, given that foreseeability is not difficult to 
establish in many situations. Proximity exists when 
 
1. the professional knew that his or her work product would be communicated to a known third party 
or a known third party class; 
2. the third party suffered damage as a result of relying on the professional’s work product; 
3. the work product was used for the purpose for which it was prepared. 
 
The professional’s knowledge includes not only actual knowledge but such knowledge as would be attributed to a 
reasonable person situated as the defendant. The knowledge requirement must be met at the time the work product 
is prepared. 
The third requirement - that it should be fair, just and reasonable - was an additional restriction to the 
Hedley Byrne principles. Based on this three-pronged test, the Court rejected the claim of Caparo Industries 
against the auditor of a company, Fidelity plc. The facts were that the plaintiff acquired shares in Fidelity based on 
the accounts of Fidelity as audited by Dickmans, the defendants. Shortly after the plaintiff acquired the shares, it 
became clear that the reality of the financial position of the company was significantly worse than what the audited 
accounts suggested. The Court ruled that in the absence of special circumstances, an auditor of a public company 
owes no duty of care to an outside investor or an existing shareholder who buys stocks in reliance on a statutory 
audit. 
According to the Caparo Court, the purpose of the audited statements is to fulfil the auditor’s statutory duty 
to the shareholders collectively and not to the stockholders as individual shareholders or third parties. 
 
3.3. The Caparo-case as a precedent 
 
Likewise, in the Al Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley- case ([1990] Ch 313), the court ruled that no duty of care is to 
exist of an auditor to the credit institution because the defendant/auditor had not issued his report to his client with 
the intention or the knowledge that the audit opinion would be communicated to the credit institution. Proximity 
required contemplation not only of a particular and identified recipient of the information but also of a particular 
and known purpose for which the defendant would foresee that the information would be relied on. 
In 1991 the James McNaughton Papers v. Hicks Anderson Court ([1991] 1 All ER 134) narrowed the scope 
of the duty of care of an auditor to third parties which are directly intended by the maker of the statement to act on 
it. Six key elements highlight the auditor’s liability to third parties: 
 
(1) the purpose for which the information was prepared; 
(2) the purpose for which the information was communicated; 
(3) the relationship between the maker of the statement (the auditor), the informed (the client) and each 
interested third party; 
(4) the size of the class to which the third party belongs; 
(5) the degree of experience of knowledge of the maker of the statement; and 
(6) the extent of the third party’s reliance. 
 
Nevertheless, the Caparo-test is the foremost approved judgment to describe and reject the auditor’s 
liability to third parties. 
More recently, the Scottish High Court decided in the context of a strike-out-application  in the Royal Bank 
of Scotland v. Bannerman Johnstone Maclay and others-case (23 July 2002) , that in preparing audited accounts, 
company’s auditors were legally responsible to a credit bank if they knew (or ought to have known) that the bank 
would rely on those accounts. In this matter, the Court rejected the auditor’s (Bannerman) attempt to narrow the 
Caparo-test by imposing a requirement that to be liable the auditors must have intended that the party seeking to 
establish a duty of care should rely on those accounts. The requirement of intent was not presented in Caparo 
itself.  
According to this jurisprudence, an auditor can exclude his liability to all identified third parties by adding 
a disclaimer to his audit report. However in circumstances in which auditors are not aware that particularly 
identified third parties are to rely on audited accounts, such individual disclaimer will be meaningless.  
 
Journal of International  Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 3, Issue 1 (2008)  
 71                        
 
 
 
4. The Netherlands 
 
Whether third parties can rely on the information of the audit report is controversial in the Dutch jurisprudence and 
doctrine. Often inspired by some American principles, the public character of the audit report is not 
acknowledged. The purpose of the audit report is to inform the general meeting and the shareholders of the true 
and fair view of the financial statements as a basis to evaluate and possibly penalize the board’s policy. More in 
particular, the minority shareholders should benefit from the information in the financial statements and audit 
report. 
But the Dutch jurisprudence and legal doctrine are not unanimous on this point. Several cases illustrate the 
auditor’s liability to third parties. 
 
4.1. Liability of an accountant 
 
On the 28th of September 1983 (NJ 1985, 120), in a case concerning an accountant, the Den Bosch High Court 
recognized the third party liability of the accountant based on the fact that an accountant’s work covers ‘the 
proprietary right of the company within judicial matters’. For this, an accountant accepts third party liability for 
his statements. Dutch legal doctrine criticizes this judgment for it is not the accountant but the (board of directors 
of the) company who is responsible for creating the financial accounts. 
Similarly, in 1990, the Utrecht Court (Rb. Utrecht 18 April 1990, unreported) accepted  the accountant 
liability to third parties for the negligent composed annual account of a company. The accountant was reluctant to 
perform additional verifications which resulted in inaccurate financial statements. The Court based his decision on 
the following criteria: 
 
(1) the accountant knew that the annual accounts were to be used to promote the company; 
(2) the accountant should have realized that the annual accounts were to be used to attract financial 
resources; 
(3) the accountant should have known that a rosy picture of the financial situation of the company could lead 
to transactions with third parties. 
 
This decision is highly criticized among the Dutch doctrine: tort liability to third parties can only be derived from 
special circumstances such as known use of the financial statements, foreseeability, and the plausible use of the 
accounts for matters such as price setting of shares for a merger or acquisition. 
 
4.2. Auditor’s Liability 
 
Especially related to audit, the Dutch jurisprudence focuses on the degree of expertise of the third party to uphold 
the auditor’s liability. 
In 1999 the Amsterdam Court decided that a credit bank can’t rely solely on the audited financial accounts 
for it has its own, separate responsibility to lend funds to the audited company (Rechtbank Amsterdam 9 juni 
1999, JOR 1999/195). 
The Utrecht Court reached a similar decision on the first of March 2000 (unreported). In 1991 creditor 
Voorhout Beheer B.V. lent Akwarius B.V. the sum of 1.115.520 euro. However, on the fourth of December 1991 
Akwarius B.V. was declared bankrupt. The credit bank tried to retrieve its losses from the auditor for his negligent 
statement. According to the Court’s decision, the credit institution acted negligently in relying on the financial 
statements and the audit report to accommodate the money because it refrained from executing its own due 
diligence.  
Only in special circumstances  is the auditors’ liability to credit institutions as a third party acknowledged, 
e.g. the explicit approval of the company to use the financial statements and the audit report. 
The Zutphen judgment is equally auditor ‘friendly’ (Rechtbank Zutphen 12 December 2002, NJ 2003, 26). 
Only the company can rely on the audit report, which implies that the auditor mainly is liable to the company. The 
duty of care of an auditor to third parties can only be derived from Caparo-like criteria. One might recognize the 
American Ultramares approach. According to the Ultramares-principle (Ultramares Corp. V. Touche Niven & 
Co., 174 N.E. 441, 443 (N.Y. 1931)), an accountant is liable only for negligence to third parties who are in privity 
of the contract (the state of two specified parties being in a contract) or privity-like relationships with the 
accountant. This doctrine provides the narrowest standard for accountants to be held liable to third parties for 
negligence. 
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On the 27th of June 2000, the Den Haag High Court (JOR 2001/70) rejected the auditor liability to third 
parties by lack of foreseeability, similar to the American Restatement approach. The Restatement approach has 
been extracted from § 522 Restatement of Torts:  
“One who, in course of his business, profession of employment, or in any other transaction in which 
he has a pecuniary intrest supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.”  
 
According to the Den Haag High Court, an auditor has a duty of care to those third parties when he 
reasonably have foreseen that his fault  could cause damage to those specified third parties.  
More recently and surprisingly, on the 13th of June 2001 (NJ 2001, 445), the Den Haag High Court 
abandoned this approach by recognizing third party liability. The High Court stated that by issuing a public 
statement, the auditor is aware of the risks involved towards third parties. The amount of expertise of the third 
party was no issue in this debate. 
The High Council has not decided yet on this matter. However, concerning different but similar liability 
matters, the court focused on the credit institutions’ own responsibility to analyze the financial statements. 
Therefore, a lead manager may not rely on the accuracy of the financial statements of the issuer (HR 2 December 
1994, NJ 1996, 246). Similarly, the High Council rejected the duty of care of an accountant to a third party which 
relied on the negligent information of the accountant (HR 9 juni 1995, NJ 1995, 692). The High Council stated 
that the third who acquired a considerable number of shares of the company, should have performed its own due 
diligence to examine the value of the company (‘s shares).  
 
5. Germany 
 
The German system is similar to the approach in the Netherlands and the UK. Based on the principles of tort law, 
the liability of a German auditor or Aβschlussprüfer to third parties is restricted. Since no explicit regulations on 
auditor liability to third parties are in place, the German doctrine and jurisprudence tried to resolve this loophole in 
the law by applying different tort law techniques: the (bloβe) Auskunftvertrag, the Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
zugunsten Dritter and the Garantievertrag. 
 
5.1. Bloβe Auskunftvertrag 
 
The jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof acknowledges that a statement ,such as an advice, could accomplish 
under different circumstances an implied agreement or bloβe Auskunftvertrag to third parties. The 
Bundesgerichtshof decided that an Abschluβprüfer consented tacitly to the third party if the information which 
was issued,  namely the audit report, was essential for the third party to take a certain decision.  The  question of 
whether both parties – the Abschluβprüfer and the third party – wanted to contract is irrelevant However, special 
circumstances should be met to establish a (bloβe) Auskunftvertrag.  
First, the Abschluβprüfer should have known his report was of great importance for the third party to take 
his decision. Second, the issuer of the information should have a certain degree of expertise which infuses special 
confidence into its clients or third parties. Concerning the audit work, an Abschluβprüfer will always possess the 
required expertise to meet with this last condition. This legal concept, established mainly by jurisprudence, was 
seriously criticised by the German doctrine imposing that this mainly fictious concept doesn’t comply with the 
consensus ad idem requirement of contract law.  This consensus is not in place within the concept of the (bloβe) 
Auskunftvertrag. To meet this criticism,  the current jurisprudence obliges an explicit consensus for this legal 
concept. 
 
5.2. Garantievertrag 
 
Another approach to the issue of the liability of an auditor is the Garantievertrag. The Garantievertrag is a more 
evolved type of the above mentioned Auskunftvertrag. By issuing a Garantievertrag in the audit report, the 
Abschluβprüfer guarantees the content of the audit report. The basis of this legal concept is found in the special 
position of the Abschluβprüfer within the legal system for he knows that his audit work will be used by interested 
parties because his report is to be published.  
The application of this Garantievertrag is obviously more limited in comparison by the Auskunftvertrag. 
The Abschluβprüfer only guarantees the accuracy and correctness (Richtigkeit seiner Auskunft) of his public 
statement and not the carefulness of his audit work. Therefore, based on this theory, an Abschluβprüfer can limit 
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his audit work to a strict minimum of shallow supervision and publish a condensed report.  Since this is not the 
purpose of an audit, this approach is not appropriate to use in the auditor’s liability issue. 
 
 
 
5.3. Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter 
 
Finally, the Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter could be applied to determine the auditors’ liability 
towards third parties. For this issue, this approach is widely accepted among the jurisprudence and the doctrine. 
According to the Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter, both contractors could have accepted in behalf of 
third parties (some of) the implications of the agreement. Occasionally, the mutual consent to imply the agreement 
to third parties is contracted tacitly by means of a ‘stillschweigenden Vereinbarung’. Thus, the contract between 
the audited company and the Abschluβprüfer could embrace a protective function towards third parties 
(Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter).  
The legal foundation of this approach is not to be found in the explicit consent between the contractors, but 
in the principle of Treu und Glauben, meaning that the protective function is fair and reasonable. However, the 
protective function or Drittschutz is not indefinite because several requirements describe the limitations of this 
approach to third parties. 
 
- Leistungs- oder Vertragsnähe: the risk of the third party should be equal to the risk the contractor – the 
audited company – has to endure caused by the negligent performance of the auditor’s duties. Based on 
this requirement, individual investors or stockbrokers seem to be excluded from the protective function of 
the Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter. 
- Glaübigernähe: a special relationship has to exist between the third party and the audited company by 
virtue of which the Abschluβprüfer has a duty of care to the third party. The Glaübigernähe is at hand as 
soon as it is contracted between the Aβschlussprüfer and the audited company. It is accepted if the 
contract stipulates some kind of special interest to safeguard a third party. This subjective requirement is 
supposed to be on hand if the Abschluβprüfer is commissioned by the company to issue a statement 
which will be made public to third parties.  
- The Abschluβprüfer knew or had to know he owed a duty of care to a third party and vice versa, the third 
party had a considerable interest in the good performance of the contract between the auditor and his 
client, the audited company.  
-  
To apply this approach, the Bundesgerichtshof decided in 1985 that it is necessary that the third party and 
the contractor of the adviser have equal interests.  
This approach makes it possible for third parties to compensate economic losses caused by false or 
misleading information and audit reports issued by the company or Abschluβprüfer. However, not even this last 
approach is without criticism as  this artificial approach ascribes much prerogative power to the courts. 
 
6. Belgium 
 
6.1. The public role of a Belgian auditor 
 
In Belgium, the liability of the auditor is not restricted towards third parties. By virtue of article 140 of the Belgian 
Company Code and the common liability principles,  a Belgian auditor is liable towards each interested party. 
Since the financial information and the audit report have to be published, third parties are able to rely on that 
information. 
Since the seventies, the public role of the auditor is acknowledged. By ordering the mandatory publication 
of the financial information, the Belgian legislator wanted to emphasize the information is meant not only to 
inform the shareholders or the company, but the public in general. Similar to the publication of the financial 
information, due to the performance of an audit by an independent and certified professional and the publication of 
it’s report, all parties involved are equally informed of the value of the public statement. Therefore, the audit 
report is a public mechanism to inform all interested parties. 
The auditor does not act solely in the interest of the company, but also in the general interest. This means 
that all users of certified financial information could found their decision on the public report. Therefore, not only 
the shareholders or the company are entitled to rely on the audit report, but all stakeholders (e.g. employees, 
creditors, …) and other interested parties. No legal or juridical limitations are enforced: a claimant has to prove 
that the negligence of the auditor has caused the damage he suffered.  As for the company, this implies that all 
third parties who relied on the financial information and the audit report to make a damaging decision could take 
legal action against the auditor to recuperate its economic losses. 
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6.2. Jurisprudence 
 
Despite this ‘tolerant’ legislation, few cases of auditor liability towards third parties exist in Belgium. Three 
remarkable cases are to be considered. 
In 1989 the liability of an auditor was upheld by the Belgian tax authorities (Rb. Brugge 6 november 1989, 
F.J.F. 1990, 44). According to article 633 of the Belgian Company Code, a general shareholders’ meeting is to be 
convened either by the board of directors or the auditor, when, as a result of losses, the Company’s equity has 
decreased to less than half of the Company’s share capital. The general shareholders’ meeting must deliberate and 
resolve on the dissolution of the Company or possible other measures.  
The Belgian tax authorities claimed the auditor was negligent to notify the shareholders’ meeting in 
accordance with article 633 of the Companies Code. They argued that if the shareholders meeting was convened 
the company wouldn’t have gone bankrupt and (most of) the indebted taxes would have been paid. The ability of 
the tax authorities to act as a claimant in a procedure against an auditor wasn’t questioned by the court. However, 
the Bruges Court rejected the auditor’s liability uttering the causal connection between the negligence of the 
auditor and the economic damage of the tax authorities wasn’t proved. No evidence existed that if the 
shareholders’ meeting was convened the indebted taxes would have been paid. 
Also credit institutions are acknowledged as third parties in auditor liability cases. No specific requirements 
e.g. expertise, as is essential in the Netherlands, exist.  
In 2002, a credit institution filed a suit against an auditor to recuperate its losses due to a judicial 
composition (Gerechtelijk akkoord) by the company (Kh. Hasselt 25 juni 2002, T.R.V. 2003, 81). Due to this 
similarity  to the Chapter 11 in the United States-procedure, the credit institution relieved   the company from 
some debts.  The credit institutions wanted to recuperate its losses from the auditor as they declared that the 
audited financial statements were used to evaluate the company’s financial situation on which basis the funds were 
granted. So according to the credit institution the false audit report led to the damage it endured. Similar to the tax 
authorities-case, the interest of the credit institution to file a suit against an auditor wasn’t questioned. The Hasselt 
Court approved the credit institution’s argumentation for it was clearly prearranged that a positive audit of the 
financial statements was a prerequisite for the credit institution to allow the funds.  
On the 12th of December 1996, the Brussels Court upheld the auditors’ liability towards a new shareholder 
of a company (T.R.V. 1997, 41).   For the acquisition, the price setting of shares of the company was based upon 
the annual accounts, audited by the company’s auditor. Within months after the acquisition, different corrections 
(e.g. a considerable amount was transferred as exceptional expenses) concerning the annual account were made as 
result of which it was obvious that the annual account did not represent a true and fair view of the company’s 
financial situation. The Brussels Court acknowledged the claimant’s argumentation that if the auditor had issued 
an unqualified audit report or an adverse audit opinion, the claimant would have been informed about the 
misleading data in the annual accounts before deciding to acquire a number of shares. 
As mentioned before, according to the Belgian legal system, no additional requirements exist for an auditor 
to be liable towards a third party. However, only few cases exist on this matter. One of the most important motives 
can be found in the difficulty to acknowledge the causation between the auditors’ statement and the third party’s 
decision: one has to prove the audit report (directly of indirectly) influenced their decision: without the auditor’s 
fault, the decision wouldn’t have been taken and the damage wouldn’t have occurred. For this, the claimant first of 
all has to prove he actually utilised the audit report before taking his decision. Secondly it must be proven that the 
financial information and annual accounts would have been different if the auditor had not been negligent. Thirdly, 
a claimant has to prove he would have taken another decision if the information had been presented correctly. 
 
7. One single monetary liability cap for all EU member states?  
 
Whether the auditor’s liability should be capped, is not the focus of this paper. Different studies, especially the 
London Economics report (2006) studied this question. Five EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece and Slovenia) have already chosen to cap auditor liability. The UK has recently introduced a regime of 
auditor liability limitation agreements into law and also the Italian and Spanish legislators are currently 
considering bringing in laws limiting auditor liability. In the US, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 
has expressed concern that the present level of auditor liability could result in the bankruptcy of an audit firm, with 
what it describes as “devastating results to corporate governance in the United States and the rest of the world” 
and has recommended that the US Congress explore protecting auditing firms from catastrophic loss. 
This paper examines the question whether all EU liability regimes could be harmonized and one single 
monetary liability cap for all EU member states is advisable. 
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 As mentioned, there are large differences between the legal systems of auditor liability of the studied EU 
Members States, especially concerning third party liability. The public role of an auditor is not acknowledged in 
the British, Dutch or German legal system. Only special circumstances could compromise the auditors’ liability 
towards third parties. According to the Belgian regime, each interested third party can be involved in a liability 
claim towards a negligent auditor. Compared to the restricted British, Dutch or German legal regimes, potentially 
more parties and thus more damage, could be involved in a liability claim towards a negligent auditor. Due to 
these differences, one single monetary liability cap is not preferable. The cap should be adjusted to the legal 
regime of each EU Member State. The more parties potentially involved, the higher the liability cap should be 
regulated.     
 
8. Conclusion 
 
To discuss the harmonization of legal cap on auditor’s liability, one might recognize not all legal liability systems 
in the European Union are equal. This paper examined the auditors’ liability towards third parties of four 
countries: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. In Belgium, each interested third party, 
e.g. tax authorities, a credit institution etc., is allowed to pursue a liability claim against an auditor. The British, 
Dutch and German legal systems necessitate special requirements, e.g. foreseeability, proximity (etc.) for a third 
party to be able to pursue the auditor.  
For two reasons, these findings are of major importance in the debate concerning the limitation of auditors’ 
liability. First of all, a liability cap will be more appropriate in countries with a ‘tolerant’ legislation towards third 
parties because potentially more parties will be involved in a liability claim against an auditor. Secondly, the 
amount of liability cap should be higher in countries with a ‘tolerant’ legislation towards thirds as potentially more 
parties are implicated and as such more damage is to be recuperated from the negligent auditor. 
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